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INTRODUCTION

On June 8, 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided
Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. McMahon.' McMahon validated the
enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements2 between stock brokerage

* University of Notre Dame (B.A. 1964, J.D. 1970), partner in firm of Wright &
L'Estrange, San Diego, California.
** United States Naval Academy (B.S. 1971), University of Texas (J.D. with honors 1980),
partner in firm of Wright & L'Estrange, San Diego, California.
The authors thank attorney H. Thomas Fehn of Fields, Fehn and Sherwin in Los Angeles
for supplying the pleadings and other papers from the Bentley case.
1. 482 U.S. 220 (1987), reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
2. A "pre-dispute arbitration agreement" is an agreement, often part of a written contract,
between a broker and investor in which each agrees to arbitrate any dispute arising from the
broker's services.
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After McMahon, and the 1987 stock market

crash, there were fewer court challenges to the enforceability of securities
industry arbitration agreements.'

This increase in the use of arbitration as

a dispute resolution mechanism has caused the emergence of non-lawyer
advocates who openly solicit business from disgruntled investors to pursue

grievances with the investors' stockbrokers.' Although certain lawyers and
groups in the securities industry have unsuccessfully attempted to halt the
activities of these unlicensed advocates, 6 as of the beginning of 1994, most
of the self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") of the securities industry that
administer arbitrations and the American Arbitration Association ("AAA")
permitted unlicensed advocates to represent parties in securities arbitrations.'
The issue is the subject of controversy. In January, 1993, the Los
Angeles County Superior Court dismissed a claim seeking rescission of a
contract based on the theory that the defendant unlicensed arbitration
advocates were illegally practicing law. 8 The court ruled that while no
precedent explicitly permitted unlicensed arbitration advocates, federal courts
favor arbitration and, therefore, would permit unlicensed arbitration
advocates to enter binding contracts to represent clients. If the Superior
Court's ruling in Bentley is upheld on any appeal, it will permit unlicensed
advocates to continue representing parties in non-judicial securities industry
arbitrations in California.
Recently, the securities industry has considered whether the SROs should
continue to allow unlicensed advocates to represent investors in arbitration

3. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 239.
4. Theodore A. Krebsbach, SecuritiesArbitrationToday: Defense Counsel Perspective, SEC.
NEWS, Summer 1994, at 28.
5. See Brigid McMenamin, Friendsof the Shafted, FORBES, Apr. 26, 1993, at 185; Richard
P. Ryder, Desperately Seeking SICA: Factionalism in Arbitration Rulemaking or Who Will
Propose The Rules Governing SRO Arbitration, SEC. NEWS, Summer 1994, at 19.
6. "Unlicensed advocates," as that term is used in this article, is meant to include lay
persons and disbarred or suspended lawyers. It does not include lawyers licensed in jurisdictions
other than California who participate in arbitration proceedings in California without sanction
from the State Bar of California. In 1990, an unsuccessful effort was made to interest the Los
Angeles District Attorney in filing a criminal complaint against a non-attorney advocate in a
securities arbitration for the unauthorized practice of law. SICA Meets, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, March 1991, at 6.
7. There are 10 SROs. They are organized pursuant to Sections 6 and 15A of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78b (1988), ("the Act"), under the auspices
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to Section 19 of the Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 78s (1988)). The organizations are the American Stock Exchange, Inc.; the Boston Stock
Exchange, Inc.; the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc.; the Cincinnati Stock Exchange,
Inc.; the Midwest Stock Exchange, Inc.; the Municipal Securities Rule-Making Board; the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD); the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.;
the Pacific Stock Exchange, Inc.; and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc. Each of these
organizations has a similar but separate procedure for resolving disputes through an alternative
dispute resolution process, primarily arbitration. See also AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOcIATION, SEcuRITIEs ARBITRATION RULES (1993) [hereinafter "AAA RULES"].
8. Bentley v. Investors Arb. Serv., Inc., No. BC 072979 (Los Angeles Cty. Sup. Ct., Jan.
18, 1993) See discussion infra part I(A).
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proceedings against their member organizations and associates.9 There are,
in fact, a number of such advocates throughout the United States (principally
in California and Florida) who advertise and offer their services to represent
investors who wish to recover investment losses through arbitration.'" A
company in Los Angeles advertises it can train unlicensed advocates to
represent claimants in securities arbitration disputes.' Its advertisement
indicates that after attending a two-day training course, a lay person can
become an effective securities advocate.' 2
In addition to SROs, there are a number of other organizations now
examining the concept of lay persons filling the role of an advocate or
providing assistance in fields traditionally occupied by lawyers. The
American Bar Association has formed the Commission on Non-Lawyer
Practice and has been holding hearings with a view to presenting a report to
the ABA House of Delegates in February, 1995.11 The Securities Industry
Conference on Arbitration ("SICA") is also examining the matter of nonlawyer representation of customers in SRO-sponsored arbitrations. A
proposed change to Section 15 of the Uniform Code of Arbitration would
severely limit the role of non-lawyer advocates."4 Public hearings on the
proposal were held in January, 1993.11 The topic was again raised at the
October, 1994, SICA meeting amidst a broader controversy between SICA
set up by the National Association of
and a newly-formed committee
16
Securities Dealers ("NASD").
This article addresses what constitutes the practice of law in California,
the activities of securities arbitration advocates, a comparison of the relative
strengths and weaknesses of unlicensed advocates compared to attorneys, and
a proposal for regulation of unlicensed advocates.

9. The rules of the SROs provide for the representation "by counsel," and make no mention
See e.g., NATIONAL
of representation by "unlicensed advocates" or "other persons."
ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY DEALERS, CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 27 (1993)
[hereinafter NASD CODE OF ARB. PRO.]. However, the Arbitrator'sManual drafted by the
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) provides: "Parties need not be represented
by an attorney in arbitration. They may choose to appear pro se (on their own) or be
represented by a person who is not an attorney, such as a business associate, friend or
relative...." SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL
6 (May 1992). The SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 23 provides "Any party may be
AMERICAN ARBITRATION
represented by counsel or other authorized representative."
ASSOCIATION, SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES § 23 (1993). An examination of the policies and
procedures of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") is beyond the scope of this article.
10. See McMenamin, supra note 5, at 185-86.
11. Advertisement, Valcor Arbitration Services, ENTREPRENEUR, Feb. 1994.
12. Id.
13. SAC Report on Non-Attorney Representation, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Jan. 1994,
at 7.
14. Non-Attorney RepresentationIn Arbitration, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Sept. 1993, at
11.
15. Letters to the Editor, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR, Feb. 1994, at 16.
16. Lynnette Khalfni, Two Panels Vie to Settle Securities Issues. Newcomer Accused of
Usurping Older Group's Role, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1994, at A5A.
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Section I will discuss the Bentley case and its implications for consumers
who are harmed by arbitration advocates. Section II will lay out the legal
standards for what activities constitute the practice of law in California.
Section I will examine the various acts of arbitration advocates which may
constitute the practice of law in California. Section IV will compare the
activities of arbitration advocates with those of licensed lawyers to examine
whether advocates provide a significant benefit over lawyers and how closely
the activities of arbitration advocates resemble those activities of securities
lawyers engaged in similar representations. Section V will propose
restrictions on the activities of arbitration advocates that could improve the
services rendered by the industry.
I. THE BENTLEY CASE AND OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Bentley
Now, years after McMahon, a California court is hearing a challenge to
the use of unlicensed advocates in Bentley v. Investors Arbitration Services,
Inc. 7 Bentley is styled as a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of "all
persons who, within the three years prior to the filing of this action, have
entered into an agreement with defendant IAS to retain IAS for the purpose
of providing expert advice, assistance, and arbitration preparation regarding
disputes with stockbrokers." 18 The Bentley complaint alleged that 77-yearold Ms. Bentley had engaged IAS to assist her in the evaluation and
resolution of potential claims against her broker, Prudential-Bache Securities,
Inc.," relating to her purchase of securities known as the VMS Mortgage
Investment Fund.' IAS allegedly "represented its services and expertise
as being at least equal to attorneys who prosecute claims in arbitration against
stockbrokers."'
After entering into a $1,000 fixed-fee agreement with IAS to pursue a
claim against Prudential for the losses in her VMS investment, but before she
filed an arbitration claim or a lawsuit, Ms. Bentley allegedly received a
notice from the federal district court in Chicago informing her of a settlement
of the VMS class action. This notice stated that she could opt out of the
VMS class action if she wanted to pursue an individual action or, if she
wanted to participate in the settlement, she could complete a claim form and
return it to the court before a specified date. 2 According to her complaint,
Ms. Bentley's IAS representative advised her not to respond to the notice.
17. Complaint at 4, Bentley (No. BC072979). See also Faccio v. Investors Arb. Serv., Inc.,
(No. BC069834), (Los Angeles Cty. Sup. Ct., Nov. 18, 1992) (the companion case).
18. Complaint 10, at 4, Bentley (No. BC072979).
19. In 1993, Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. changed its name to Prudential Securities, Inc.
20. Complaint
1, 10, 12, 15-18, Bentley (No. BC072979).
21. Id. '113.
22. Id. 11 19-22.
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She allegedly followed the representative's advice and, as a result, lost her
right to pursue an individual action (by being included in the class settlement)
and reportedly missed the deadline to submit a claim form.' Instead of
responding to the class action notice, IAS allegedly filed an arbitration claim,
under the arbitration rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"), against Prudential for Ms. Bentley.24
After IAS filed the claim against Prudential, Ms. Bentley's matter was
assigned to another IAS case worker who allegedly advised her to dismiss the
arbitration claim and submit a belated claim form in the class action pending
in federal District Court in Chicago.' Allegedly, IAS kept the $1,000 fee
paid by Ms. Bentley on the basis that IAS had worked up the case.
Ms. Bentley's complaint against IAS alleged causes of action for
rescission of an illegal contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and
fraud.27 On June 11, 1993, in response to pre-answer motions by the
defendants, the Los Angeles County Superior Court disallowed, without
28
leave to amend, the cause of action for rescission of an illegal contract.
Ms. Bentley had based that cause of action on the allegations that IAS was
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.29
The Superior Court's ruling was not based on any state or federal
statute, any rule promulgated by one of the SROs of the securities industry,
or any published California decision on point. 3 The ruling cited the
Federal Arbitration Act and comments regarding that Act by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc. 31 as
well as the policy statements of state and federal courts encouraging the use
of arbitration. 2

23. Id. 23-24.
24. Id. 25-27.
25. Id. 28-29.
26. Id. 31-33.
27. Id. 35-58.
28. Court's Ruling on Defs.' Mot. to Strike & Defs.' Dems., Bentley v. Investors Arb.
Serv., Inc., (No. BC072979) (Los Angeles Cty. Sup. Ct., Jan. 18, 1993) (Bentley's later
petition to the appellate court for a writ of mandate was denied); Court's Ruling on Def.'s Mot.
to Strike and Def.'s Dem., Faccio v. Investors Arb. Sevs., Inc., No. BC069834 (Los Angeles
Cty. Sup. Ct., Nov. 18, 1992).
29. Complaint
35-37 Bentley (No. BC072979).
30. There are no published California decisions relating to the activities of unlicensed
advocates in securities industry related disputes. In December, 1993, after the Bentley motions
were decided, the Circuit Court of Genesee County, Michigan, granted a motion by Prudential
Securities, Inc. to preliminarily enjoin lay advocates from pursuing claims on behalf of
disgruntled investors on the ground that such activity constituted the unauthorized practice of law
in Michigan. See Opinion/Order Granting PIs. Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Prudential Sec. v.
McQuillan, No. 93-19858-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct., Cty. of Genesee, Dec. 3, 1993).
31. 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988).
32. Record at 5-7, Faccion v. Investors Arb. Servs., Inc., BC069834 (Los Angeles Cty.
Sup. Ct., June 11, 1993).
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B. Does FederalLaw Preempt California'sRegulation
Of The PracticeOf Law?
The federal preemption argument articulated by the defendants in Bentley
is that Congress required the SROs to draft rules and implement procedures
to regulate themselves and discipline their members. 3 Congress also
required the SEC to review and approve any proposed rule to ensure that
such rule is consistent with the requirements and objectives of the Securities
and Exchange Act before that proposed rule can take effect."
As a
consequence of its oversight of the securities industry SROs,35 the SEC may
"abrogate, add to, and delete from any proposed rules that are not consistent
with the requirements and objectives of the Securities and Exchange Act." 3"
Therefore, the argument continues, the SEC's approval of the SROs' codes
of arbitration binds the courts;37 and the SICA Arbitrator's Manual is an
approved part of that SEC-authorized arbitration framework. 8
The self-proclaimed purpose of the SICA Arbitrator's Manual is to
provide general guidance in the interpretation of the Uniform Code of
Arbitration ("UCA"), which was also drafted by SICA, to arbitrators
conducting arbitrations under the auspices of the SROs.39 The UCA does
not itself specifically state that parties may be represented by unlicensed
advocates. However, under the heading "REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL", the Arbitrator's Manual states: "Parties need not be represented by
an attorney in arbitration. They may choose to appear pro se (on their own)
or be represented by a person who is not an attorney, such as a business
associate, friend or relative."'

33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-83 (1988).

34. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (1988).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 776.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1988).
37. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1987); Cohen
v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1988).

38. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Enforcement of Arbitrators'
Orders Under the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31464,
57 Fed. Reg. 55011 (Nov. 23, 1992); Wall Street's Arbitration System: Friend Or Foe?, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1989, at 1. Cf. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713,
717-18 (7th Cir. 1994) (declining to follow a provision of the SICA Arbitrator's Manual which
authorized the award of punitive damages because that provision was in conflict with New York
law, selected by the parties to govern the dispute, and avoiding the preemption argument by
relying on the choice of law clause in the agreement).
39. The Preface to the Manual states:
This manual has been compiled by members of the Securities Industry Conference on

Arbitration (SICA) as a guide for arbitrators.

It is designed to supplement and

explain the Uniform Code of Arbitration as developed by SICA. The procedures and
policies contained in this manual may be altered by the arbitrators and should not be
used to restrict a panel's discretion.
SICA ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 9, at ii.
40. Id. at 5.
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The Bentley defendants pointed to a statement in a text by commentators
on securities arbitrations to the effect that unlicensed advocates are permitted
to represent parties in arbitrations before the SROs. 4 ' Plaintiff Bentley
argued that federal law, and particularly the Federal Arbitration Act and the
Securities and Exchange Act, does not preempt the field of arbitration procedure.42 Ms. Bentley also argued that California law did not conflict with
any federal law, claiming:
The only federal 'rule' cited by defendants to support their unauthorized
practice of law before the industry arbitration fora is found in a handbook
lmown as the Arbitrator's Manual. This handbook has never been

approved by the SEC under the rule-making authority of Section 19 of the

Exchange Act and no argument can possibly be made that it has the force
of federal law for purposes of the Supremacy Clause.43

The Los Angeles County Superior Court sustained the demurrer in
Bentley without leave to amend, basing its holding on Cohen v. Wedbush,
Noble, Cooke, Inc.,' in which Judge Kozinski "referred to the Federal
Arbitration Act as a body of substantive law of arbitrability enforceable in
both state and federal courts and preempting any state laws or policies to the

contrary, and indicating that such arbitrations are under federal standards." 45
The Bentley court observed that securities industry arbitrations arise out
of an act of Congress and are policed by the SEC, which has given
considerable regulatory leeway to the SROs. It acknowledged there is no
controlling case law, but noted that commentators support the view that
unlicensed persons may act as advocates in securities arbitrations. The court
also took into account that in other specialty areas unlicensed persons act as
advocates in the arbitration framework. 46
Neither side in Bentley cited or relied upon In re FirstChoice Securities
Corporation.47 First Choice was a review by the SEC of certain disciplinary action taken by the NASD. The primary issue in First Choice was
whether First Choice Securities Corporation was bound by a restriction
agreement. However, the applicants in First Choice argued that they were

41. Mem. of P. & A., in Supp. of Dem. & Mot. to Strike, at p. 12 n. 13, Bentley v.
Investors Arb. Sevs., Inc., No. BC072979 (Los Angeles Cty. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1993) (citing
ANTHONY W. DJINIS & JOSEPH A. POST, SECURITIES ARBITRATION § 8.04[2] at 8-9 (1992)).
42. Mem. of P. & A. in Opp'n to Dem. & Mot. to Strike at 5-6, Bentley (No. BC072979)
(citing Volt Info. Science v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1989).
43. Id. at 11-12.
44. 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988).

45. Record at 5, Faccion v. Investors Arb. Servs., Inc., Nos. BC072979 & BC069834 (Los

Angeles Cty. Sup. Ct., June 1, 1993).

46. Id. at 5-7.
47. Exchange Act, Release No. 31,089, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
[hereinafter SEC Rel. No. 31,089].
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denied the right to be represented by a securities consultant who was not an
attorney. They asserted that the Administrative Procedure Act48 provides
that any person compelled to appear before any agency shall be accorded the
right to be accompanied, represented and advised by counsel or a qualified
representative. Rejecting that argument, the SEC stated:
However, the AdministrativeProcedureAct does not apply to the proceedings before the NASD, as it is not a federal agency. Proceedings before

the NASD are governed by Article II, Section 7(c) of the NASD's Code
of Procedure, which provides that a respondent in an NASD disciplinary
proceeding shall be entitled to appear personally or to be represented 'by
counsel.'

We believe that the plain meaning of the term 'counsel' is

attorney. We note further that Applicants have not demonstrated any
prejudice from the NASD's action. Applicants were represented by an
attorney at the hearing and thereafter. Further, the consultant testified and
argued, unencumbered and without objection, as a witness at 49the District
hearing and advised Applicants' attorney during that hearing.

Whether federal law preempts California's regulation of the practice of
law appears to remain uncertain.
C. Is A Private ContractArbitration Subject To State Law Concerning
The Licensing Of Attorneys?

Recent Court decisions have expressed a strong policy in favor of
enforcing arbitration agreements. 0 The United States Supreme Court has
instructed state and federal courts to be very liberal in their construction and
enforcement of arbitration agreements. The terms of the agreement are
deemed to include the rules of the arbitration forum designated in the
agreement or contemplated by the parties."1
The issue is whether unlicensed advocates are exempt from state
statutory prohibitions against the unauthorized practice of law when parties
contractually agree to arbitration, and that agreement invokes, explicitly or
implicitly, rules of a forum that allow unlicensed advocates to assist and/or
represent parties.

48. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1988).
49. SEC Rel. No. 31,089, supra note 47, at 8 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
50. See Volt Info. Sciences v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1056 (1987).
51. See, e.g., Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding an award of punitive
damages in an AAA securities arbitration even though Minnesota law prohibited arbitration
panels from awarding such damages), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 287 (1993); Todd Shipyards
Corp. v. Cunard Line, 943 F.2d 1056, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1991); Schulze & Burch Biscuit Co.
v. Tree Top, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (incorporating AAA rules into the
contract because the drafters contemplated AAA arbitration), afftd, 831 F.2d 709 (7th Cir.
1987); Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992) (the scope of arbitration is a
matter of agreement between the parties).
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In Bentley, the defendants argued that as a matter of federal law, "the

rules of the arbitration forum apply over state or federal law."52 However,
the Los Angeles County Superior Court did not base its ruling on that
argument. This issue remains unsettled.
The issue is broader than the ability of investors and stockbrokers to
contract around state regulation of the practice of law. As the Bentley case
illustrates, the role of an advocate in a dispute between an investor and a
stockbroker is more involved than arguing and presenting evidence at a
hearing. Likewise, the state regulation of the practice of law has a much
wider scope than courtroom activities.
It is naive to say that federal law preempts state regulation of the practice
of law based solely on the SICA Arbitrators Manual of suggested procedures.
The SICA manual states only that a party to a securities arbitration may
either appear pro se or be represented by a person who is not an attorney.
If that statement means an unlicensed person is permitted to act as an
advocate in any arbitration between an investor and a stockbroker, then it is
not limited to those instances where an investor has signed a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement. Even in the absence of an agreement to arbitrate
disputes, the stockbroker is required to submit all disputes to binding
arbitration upon demand of the customer.5
The implication is that an
unlicensed advocate can legitimize his role by convincing the client/investor
to demand arbitration rather than file a complaint in court. This suggests a
need to identify and examine all activities of a person who aspires to act as
an advocate for an investor in a dispute with his or her stockbroker. Only
then can it be determined whether state or federal law should control.54
To provide guidance in answering this question, Section II identifies the
different types of activities California courts have found to constitute the
practice of law. Section I has a detailed examination of the types of
activities normally done by an advocate in a securities dispute from the first
identification of the problem, preparation of the claim, pre-hearing activities
through the hearing and afterwards. Section IV examines the consequences
of using a lawyer and an unlicensed advocate in a securities dispute. Section
V contains a proposal.

52. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Dem. & Mot. to Strike at 10, Bentley (No. BC072979)
(citing Lee, 983 F.2d 883; Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1062-63).
53. NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 12(a) provides that members of the NASD
(brokerage firms) and associated persons (registered persons who work for brokerage firms) are
required to submit customer disputes to binding arbitration upon the demand of the customer
even in the absence of a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate. NASD CODE OF ARB.PRO., supra

note 9, at 9.

54. It is assumed in this article that in most instances the industry participant in a securities
arbitration will utilize a licensed attorney as its advocate.
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WHAT CONSTITUTES "THE PRACTICE OF LAW" IN VIOLATION OF

THE CALIFORNIA STATE BAR ACT?
A key issue that has yet to be resolved by any California appellate court
is whether the activities of unlicensed advocates in private securities
arbitrations constitute the practice of law in violation of the California State
Bar Act. 55
The California State Bar Act states "No person shall practice law in
California unless the person is an active member of the State Bar." 56 There
is no statutory definition of what constitutes the practice of law in California.
However, California courts have defined a number of activities which fall
within the definition. In the frequently cited case of People v. Merchants'
Protective Corp.," the California Supreme Court, in adopting a definition
of the practice of law from an Indiana case, stated:
As the term is generally understood, the practice of law is the doing and
performing services in a court of justice in any matter depending therein
throughout its various stages and in conformity with the adopted rules of
procedure. But in a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel and
the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights5 8are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.
In determining what constitutes the practice of law in California, it is the
character of the act, not where it is performed, that is determinative. 9 The
California Supreme Court stated in 1970: "In close cases, the courts have
determined that the resolution of legal questions for another by advice and
action is practicing law 'if difficult or doubtful legal questions are involved
which, to safeguard the public, reasonably demand the application of a
trained legal mind."'0 The court went on to say: "[I]f the application of
legal knowledge and technique is required, the activity constitutes the
practice of law, even if conducted before an administrative board or commission."6" It takes very little to constitute the practice of law. A single act
is all that is required, not a course of conduct. 2

55. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West 1994).
56. Id.
57. 209 P. 363 (Cal. 1922).
58. Id. at 365 (quoting Eley v. Miller, 34 N.E. 836, 837-38 (Ind. App. 1893)). See also
Farnham v. State Bar of California, 552 P.2d 1445 (Cal. 1976); Bluestein v. State Bar of
California, 529 P.2d 599 (Cal. 1974); Baron v. City of Los Angeles, 469 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1970);
Crawford v. State Bar of California, 355 P.2d 490 (Cal. 1960); People v. Landlords
Professional Services, 264 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Ct. App. 1989); People v. Sipper, 142 P.2d 960
(Cal. Ct. App. 1943).
59. Baron, 469 P.2d at 358.

60. Id. (citations omitted).
61. Id.
62. Sipper, 142 P.2d at 962; People v. Ring, 70 P.2d 281, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937).
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In accord with these principles, California courts have analyzed different
fact patterns and concluded that a variety of activities by lay persons may
constitute the practice of law. For example, in Morgan v. State Bar," the
California Supreme Court held that conducting settlement negotiations
constitutes the practice of law.' 4 Advising a person what type of document
to complete to obtain a loan65 and assisting clients in the preparation, filing
and resolution of unlawful detainer actions also have been characterized as
practicing law in California."6 California's regulation ofthose who purport
to practice law within its borders is not limited to activities concerning state
law. Whenever a person gives advice on any law, including the law of
California, federal law, or the law of any other state or country, it can
constitute the practice of law.67
There are no reported California appellate decisions that address whether
appearance in a private arbitration conducted according to a pre-dispute
arbitration provision between the participating parties constitutes the practice
of law. Federal courts outside California are divided on the issue. In
American Automobile Association v. Merrick,6" the court stated, "We are
not, therefore, prepared to hold that a creditor may not attempt through an
agent a peaceful collection of a liquidated claim, or that a creditor may not
agree through an agent to an arbitration of his claim." '69 However, in
considering pre-filing settlement negotiations, the Merrickcourt specifically
held that "the giving of advice prior to collection of a claim and the urging
of legal propositions in discussions with the person from whom collection is
attempted does involve the practice of law and may be performed only by
lawyers who possess the required skill. 7 However, in Williamson P.A.
v. John D. Quinn Construction Corp.,71 the District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that the representation of a party in an arbitration
does not constitute the practice of law.'
State courts are similarly split. In State ex rel. Pearsonv. Gould,7' the
Indiana Supreme Court held that representing an employee before the State
Employees' Appeals Commission was not the practice of law. However, in
PrudentialSecurities, Inc. v. McQuillan, a Michigan County Circuit Court
63. 797 P.2d 1186 (Cal. 1990).

64. Id. at 1188.
65. Sipper, 142 P.2d at 962.
66. People v. Landlords Professional Services., 264 Cal. Rptr. 548, 553 (Ct. App. 1989).
67. Bluestein v. State Bar of California, 529 P.2d 599, 606 (Cal. 1974). There is a specific
provision in California law for the registration and certification of foreign-registered legal
consultants who are permitted, after passing certain requirements, to provide advice within the
state of California regarding foreign law in certain limited circumstances. CAL. R. CT. 988.
68. 117 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1940).

69. Id. at 25.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
537 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Id. at 616.
437 N.E.2d 41 (Ind. 1982).
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granted a motion by Prudential Securities to preliminarily enjoin lay
advocates from pursuing claims on behalf of disgruntled investors on the
ground that such activity constituted the unauthorized practice of law in
Michigan.74 The Circuit Court said:
Lawyers counsel and advise clients on their problems, remedies that may
be available and then recommend a certain plan of action. The very
essence of practicing law is not compiling paper work, filing such
documents as coming to court, but rather is giving advice to clients who
present problems to you for resolution.'
In sum, it is unclear how California appellate courts will ultimately
resolve the issue. However, the consequences of an unlicensed person either
practicing law or holding himself out as authorized to practice law in
California include possible criminal prosecution as a misdemeanor offense. 6

I1. THE AcTIVITIEs OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION ADVOCATES THAT
BEAR UPON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THEY
ENGAGE IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Given the relatively broad standard for what activities constitute the
practice of law, it is insightful to examine the wide range of activities
arbitration advocates engage in while representing consumers. This section
will examine the entire process of representation from pre-filing claim
evaluation through post-hearing claim resolution to examine the many
activities that may constitute the practice of law.
74. Order Granting Pls., Req. for Preli. Inj., Prudential Securities, Inc. v. McQuillan (No.
93-19858-CZ) (Mich. Cir. Ct., Cty. of Genesee, Dec. 3, 1993).
75. Id. at 2.
76. Section 6126 of the California Business and Professions Code states:
a.
Any person advertising or holding himself or herself out as practicing
or entitled to practice law or otherwise practicing law who is not an active member
of the state bar, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
b.
Any person who has been involuntarily enrolled as an inactive member
of the state bar or has been suspended from membership from the state bar, or has
been disbarred, or has resigned from the state bar with no charges pending, and
thereafter advertises or holds himself or herself out as practicing law or entitled to
practice law, is guilty of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or
county jail. However, any person who has been involuntarily enrolled as an inactive
member of the state bar pursuant to paragraph 1 of subdivision E of section 6007 and
who knowingly thereafter advertises or holds himself or herself out as practicing law
or otherwise entitled to practice law, is guilty of a crime punishable by imprisonment
in the state prison or county jail.
C.
The willful failure of a member of the state bar, or one who has
resigned or been disbarred, to comply with an order of the Supreme Court to comply
with Rule 955 constitutes a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or
county jail.
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A. Pre-FilingActivities
Most claims in securities arbitrations originate with a dissatisfied
customer who has lost money in a securities transaction.7 Typically, after
inquiring about possible restitution but failing to receive satisfaction from the
brokerage firm which handled the transaction, the customer considers the
possibility of suing the brokerage firm to recover his damages.
The customer may seek assistance from either a lawyer or an unlicensed
advocate. Alternately, the customer can pursue the claim on his own behalf
without assistance. It is at this early stage of the relationship between
advocates and disgruntled customers that the advocates begin to provide
services that can be construed as the practice of law. The advertisements and
promotional material created by unlicensed advocates encourage customers
to use7 8 their services to evaluate and pursue claims against brokerage
firms.

After being attracted to an advocate either by a public advertisement or
someone's recommendation, the customer relies on the advocate to analyze
the potential claim and assist in making decisions.79 Initially, the advocate
must determine whether there are damages and whether the securities broker
violated a legal duty owed to the customer. In making this threshold
decision, the customer and the advocate must necessarily analyze the legal
duties owed by securities brokers to customers. Such analysis requires a
basic knowledge of tort and contract law and federal and state statutes
pertaining to the sale of securities.80
When analyzing the customer's damages, the advocate should have some
familiarity with remedies, conflict-of-law principles, relevant statutes of

77. Infrequently, such claims are initiated by the broker-dealer against the private customer
for failure to repay money borrowed in a margin loan. Sometimes, in such claims, the customer
will file a counterclaim seeking damages for losses in related securities transactions.
78. The Retainer Agreement in Bentley states that the client retained IAS as its agent to "act
on Client's behalf in the investigation, preparation, negotiation, presentation, and arbitration of
Client's complaints against Third Party(ies) and to act as Client's agents." Retainer Agreement,
attached as Ex. A to Compl., at 1, Bentley v. Investors Arb. Sevs., Inc., No. BC072979 (Los
Angeles Cty. Sup. Ct., Jan. 18, 1993).
79. At this early stage, involving analysis of monthly statements and other brokerage firm
documents, the assistance of a person knowledgeable in securities industry matters is often much
more valuable than legal advice from an attorney, especially if it is a small claim. PHILIP J.
HOBLIN, JR., SECURITIES ARBITRATION - PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES 3-4 (2d ed. 1992).
[hereinafter HOBLIN].
80. For example, a client may attempt to pursue a claim against a brokerage house based
on a firm's misleading advice. As a result, the client did not purchase a new issue of stock, and
that stock had a dramatic rise in the immediate after-market. These facts probably would not
give rise to a compensable claim-because it did not arise in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
A person unfamiliar with the applicable securities laws may not immediately recognize that the
client's complaint would not be the basis for a valid securities claim in arbitration or court.
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limitations, and many other potential legal issues."' Sometimes different
remedies apply depending upon what types of claim a customer makes. For
example, the remedy may be different if a customer chooses to pursue a
claim for a sale of securities by an unlicensed salesman, rather than pursuing
a claim based on the theory of fraud or negligent misrepresentation under the
common law of the state where the transaction occurred. 2 The most
favorable legal theory for the customer also may involve a statute of
limitation different from that of other potential legal theories; and the more
favorable legal theory could be lost if the advocate does not make the claim

quickly. 3
Another issue that may confront the customer is whether there is an
enforceable arbitration agreement.' Resolution of this issue involves such
sub-issues as whether the contract that includes the arbitration clause is valid,
whether the contract was induced by fraud and whether that may be a basis
to avoid arbitration, and whether there is a connection between the transaction that led to the customer's losses and the contract that contains the
arbitration clause. If there is a choice between arbitration and a lawsuit, it
may be more desirable for the customer to pursue his remedy via arbitration
rather than via a lawsuit.85

81. For example, if the client was solicited in Texas by a securities salesman based in
California who happened to be on vacation in Texas, and then had the order executed through
the Texas office of the salesman's firm, the client might be entitled to rescission under the Blue
Sky laws of Texas inasmuch as the solicitation occurred in Texas by a securities salesman not
licensed by the State of Texas. See TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 581-29(A) (West 1964) (the
violation) and TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. § 581-33(A)(1) (West 1964) (customer entitled to
rescission).
82. Compare remedies available under Texas Securities Act, Art. 581-33A(1) (allowing
rescission); TEX. Civ. CODE ANN. § 581-33 (West 1964); see also Berry Petroleum Co. v.
Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1975); Section 10(b)(5) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78 (1988); and SEC Rule lOb-5 17 C.F.R. 240.106-5 (1994) (allowing out of pocket
expenses).
83. Compare and contrast the statutes of limitations for Texas securities violations,
California securities violations, violations of Section 12 (1933 Act) and violations of Section 10b
(1934 Act). The calculation of when the statute of limitations begins to run becomes more
legally complex if there is a related class action pending, as in Bentley. Bentley v. Investors
Arb. Servs., Inc., No. BC072979 (Los Angeles Cty. Sup. Ct., Jan. 18, 1993). Under both
federal and California law, the statute is tolled while the class action is pending. American Pipe
& Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S, 345
(1983)) Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923 (Cal. 1988). However, there is doubt as to
whether or not the statute begins to run again if there is a denial of class certification. See, eg.,
Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1988).
84. For example, if the securities broker's discussions with the investor are conducted in
Spanish, the contract containing the arbitration clause might be void if the securities broker
failed to provide a Spanish language translation. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1632 (West 1994).
Whether a dispute is arbitrable can be a very complex legal issue. See, e.g., H. WARREN
KNIGHT ET AL., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4-46 to 4-54 (The
Rutter Group, 1993).
85. Even if there is no agreement to arbitrate, the customer normally has the option to
compel the securities salesman or brokerage firm into arbitration if they are members of one of
the self-regulatory organizations that requires its members to submit to arbitration demanded by
a public customer. See, e.g., NASD CODE OF ARB. PRO., supra note 9, § 12(a),

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol31/iss1/5

14

L'Estrange,
and Nevitt,:IN
TheCALIFORNIA
ParticipationSECURITIES
of Unlicensed
Advocates 87
in California in the Re
1994] UNLICENSED
ADVOCATES
DISPUTES

Once the advocate identifies the appropriate legal theory and determines
the amount of damages 6 and whether an arbitration or a lawsuit will
provide the most favorable forum for the customer, the advocate must decide
which parties to name in the arbitration or lawsuit (the brokerage firm alone,
the brokerage firm and the securities salesman, or the branch office manager,
etc.), and whether personal jurisdiction can be obtained over all parties.'
The advocate and customer may also want to consider the possibility of
initiating both an arbitration and a parallel lawsuit in state or federal court
so the customer can obtain the discovery benefits available in the court
proceeding that would not otherwise be available in the arbitration but which
could be used in the arbitration. If there is a choice to simultaneously pursue
remedies in dual forums, this would put an unlicensed advocate at a
disadvantage inasmuch as he would not be permitted to practice in a parallel
court proceeding and licensed counsel would have to be hired to assist.88
In addition to the basic proceeding, be it in arbitration or lawsuit, the
customer also may want to seek provisional relief as an adjunct to the main
proceeding. In some cases, it might be appropriate to seek an injunction or
prejudgment attachment.
In California arbitrations, such provisional
remedies must be obtained through a parallel court proceeding.89 These
issues dovetail with the basic proceeding and should not be considered as
independent issues.
There are many other issues to be considered prior to actually drafting
and filing an arbitration claim. One such issue is whether to pursue prefiling settlement negotiations with the prospective respondents/defendants.
86. There are many legal considerations in regard to the calculation of damages. For
example, which law governs: federal or state, and if state, which state? Is the claimant entitled
to pre-award interest, at what rate and how is it measured? See, e.g., First Commercial Fin.
Group, Inc. v. Baghdoian [Current Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 25,565 (N.D. Ill.
1993). Does the claimant have to offset losses on the investment which is the subject of his
claim to account for profits in other investments? See, e.g., Kane v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 916 F.2d 643 (11th Cir. 1990); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 385-86 (9th Cir. 1990).
It is very important to present the correct damage theory, because if there is a mistake in the
award, it is very difficult to have it changed. See Mcllroy v. PaineWebber, Inc., 989 F.2d 817
(5th Cir. 1993); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Burke, 741 F. Supp. 191 (N.D.
Cal. 1990).
87. As part of the decision on what persons and entities to name as respondents or
defendants, the client and his advocate will necessarily have to consider legal issues such as:
(i) whether a non-signatory agent of a contracting party can be compelled to arbitrate (see, e.g.,
Letizia v. Prudential Bache See., Inc., 802 F.2d 1185, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1986)); and (ii)
whether he can obtain personal jurisdiction over all the individual defendants if the choice is to
file a lawsuit (e.g., San Mateo County Transit Dist. v. Dearman, Fitzgerald & Roberts, Inc.,
979 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992)).
88. Joint representation by an unlicensed advocate and a lawyer raises other problems,
especially if the unlicensed advocate is representing the client on a contingent fee basis. In
California, licensed attorneys are barred from splitting fees with unlicensed persons. CAL. R.
PROF. CONDUCT § 1-320 (1994).
The Investors Arbitration Services ("IAS") retention
agreement attached to the Bentley complaint provides: "Where the services of a licensed
attorney are required to further the client's cause, IAS is authorized to employ an attorney at no
additional expense to the client." Retainer Agreement, attached as Ex. A to compl., Bentley v.
Investors Arb. Sevs., Inc., No. BC072979 (Los Angeles Cty. Sup. Ct., Jan. 18, 1993).
89. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1281.8 (West 1994).
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To effectively pursue settlement negotiations, the customer or his advocate
must be prepared to describe to the prospective respondents/defendants their
breaches of duties and the consequences of those breaches, including the
damages that could be awarded to the customer. If a settlement is achieved
during these negotiations, it will be necessary to draft and negotiate the
settlement documentation with appropriate disclosures, releases, and other
terms.
In addition to possible settlement, the customer and his advocate also
may find it advantageous to coordinate with other claimants who have similar
claims against the same respondents/defendants. If those claimants have
stronger claims, it might be in the interest of the customer to wait until those
other claims are pursued to a successful conclusion in another arbitration or
lawsuit. The results of those other arbitrations may then be used as offensive
collateral estoppel against the respondents, thus easing the customer's
burden. 9° If the advocate and the customer exhaust the possibility of
settlement or elect not to pursue pre-filing settlement, assuming there is no
need to coordinate with any parties with similar claims, and further assuming
that arbitration, rather than litigation, is determined to be the appropriate
course, the next step is to draft the statement of claim and submit it to the
appropriate forum.
Since the end result of the arbitration will be an award which can be
converted into a final judgment, it is important that the customer-claimant
state his claim as completely and accurately as possible. Moreover, the rules
of most of the SROs provide that the claimant is restricted to proving at the
arbitration only those things which are alleged in the statement of claim.',
For that reason, it is important that the claimant and his advocate prepare the
liability and damages section of the claim with the appropriate specificity so
as to give the claimant the maximum latitude in proving his claim at the
hearing, but not so narrowly as to jeopardize his ability to effectively change
his position at the hearing if he discovers additional facts or an additional
legal theory.
Part of the decision in filing the claim is also the choice of situs. When
making the initial filing, a claimant has the ability to request a specific
hearing situs, which may be an important strategic consideration.
During this initial consideration process, the advocate is necessarily
providing advice to the claimant about different strategy considerations.
Whether those communications are oral or in writing, they may be subject
to discovery later during the hearing if the advocate is not a lawyer and the

90. The results of a completed arbitration can have a collateral estoppel effect on the party
participants. ACMAT Corp. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 442 F. Supp. 772,
783-84 (D. Conn. 1977). The collateral estoppel effect of an arbitration award can take effect

even prior to the confirmation of that award into a final judgment. Clark v. Bear Steams &
Co., 966 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1992); Wellons, Inc. v. T.E. Ibberson Co., 869 F.2d 1166, 1169
(8th Cir. 1989).
91. See, e.g., NASD CODE OF ARB. PRO., supra note 9, § 25(a).
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communications are not protected by the cloak of privilege applicable to
lawyer-client communications. 2
Finally, in the course of making his decisions on what claims to pursue,
the client and his advocate should be cognizant of certain issues that are
beyond the scope of the arbitration itself. For example, if the claimant has
made undisclosed tape recordings of telephone communications with his
stockbroker, those recordings may contain very useful information helpful to
proving his claim. However, in California it is a misdemeanor to record
communications without the consent of all parties involved in the communication.' By alleging the existence of those recordings in the statement of
claim, a claimant may unintentionally incriminate himself.
Furthermore, claimants are sometimes not completely candid with the
IRS when reporting profits and losses in connection with securities transactions. By making certain allegations in the statement of claim, the claimant
may obtain a short-term benefit but may also expose himself to tax liability
and other consequences with the taxing authorities. All of these considerations should be discussed with the claimant as part of the process of
determining whether and how to pursue the claim.
Thus, the pre-filing activities, if properly done, are not to be taken
lightly by either an attorney or an unlicensed advocate. There are many
issues, with concomitant tactical and strategic ramifications, to be considered.
B. Post-FilingActivities
The submission of a completed claim begins the dispute resolution
process in an arbitration.94 The SRO or other agency receiving the claim
first reviews the paperwork to ensure it is in compliance with applicable
administrative rules. If it is not, the claim may be returned to the claimant
and his advocate, who should be prepared to respond either by making
adjustments in the claim to bring it into compliance with the rules or
explaining to the agency why compliance is not necessary or possible. 95

92. See Samuels v. Mitchell, 155 F.R.D. 195 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (voluntary disclosure of

privileged documents to an accountant, not specifically hired to assist an attorney, waives the
privilege).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 1994). But the admissibility of recorded evidence
might be different if the call was made between California and Texas. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511

(1988); United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Evidence obtained in
violation of neither the Constitution nor federal law in admissible in federal court proceedings
without regard to state law").

94. See, e.g., NASD CODE OF ARB. PRO., supra note 9, § 25.
95. For example, if the statement of claim requests punitive damages, the claimant should

be aware of the conflicting decisions on this issue (cf. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 20 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. granted 115 S. Ct. 305 (1994); and J. Alexander Sec.
v. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 2182) and be
prepared to provide legal justification for the request. If the claim only states theories under
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988) then a claim for
punitive damages would not be legally appropriate. Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079 (6th Cir. 1993).
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After the paperwork and the appropriate fees have been submitted, the
claim is then served directly on the respondents by the agency.96 Upon
receipt, the respondents will typically analyze the claim and decide whether
to initiate settlement negotiations and/or engage counsel to represent their
interests in the pre-hearing process and at the hearing itself.
If the respondents elect to actively pursue settlement negotiations, both
the claimant and his advocate should be prepared to evaluate settlement
proposals. If an agreement is reached, the advocate should participate in the
process of drafting the appropriate paperwork and effecting the settlement,
making sure that all the claimant's rights are protected. Settlement
negotiations and documentation are routinely handled by licensed lawyers.
There are continuing education seminars to update lawyers on various
techniques used in settlement negotiations to protect the client and provide
the best possible result. For example, it is sometimes possible to structure
the settlement in such a way so as to provide for the most favorable tax
treatment of the settlement proceeds received by the client. 9
If the respondents and their counsel" elect not to pursue settlement
negotiations, or if settlement negotiations do not result in an agreement, the
next step in the process is for the respondents to file a statement of answer
as provided in the rules 99 and/or a written challenge to the statement of
claim. Challenges to the statement of claim can involve such things as a
motion to strike extraneous documents-such as correspondence evidencing
pre-filing settlement negotiations between the parties or newspaper articles,
etc." ° The defendants also may move to dismiss the claim entirely, if on
its face it is barred by an applicable statute of limitations. 101 The claimant
and his advocate should be prepared to respond to all these procedural
maneuvers. 102
Typically, these pre-hearing motions are resolved either by one of the
staff attorneys with the arbitration office of the arbitration administrator, a

96. NASD CODE OF ARB. PRO., supra note 9, § 25(a).
97. See, e.g., Sandy Kasten & Brad Seligman, Tax Considerationsin Settling Employment
Cases, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1985, at 13; Paul R. McDaniel et al., Damage Awards and Settlement
and InsuranceRecoveries, in FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION-CASES AND MATERIALs 240 (3d ed.

1994).

98. The respondents almost always hire licensed lawyers to represent their interests either
from their in-house legal staffs or from private lawyers engaged for the particular dispute.
HOBLIN, supra note 79, at 54.
99. NASD CODE OF ARB. PRO., supra note 9, § 25(b).
100. HOBLIN, supra note 79, at 7-7.
101. NASD CODE OF ARa. PRO., supra note 9, § 15; Castellano v. Prudential Bache Sec.,
Inc. [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 95,321, at 96,534 (July 18, 1990).
102. If, for example, there is a challenge to the entire claim based on the statute of
limitations, the claimant and his advocate should be prepared to file the appropriate legal papers
describing why the statute of limitations was tolled because of such theories as fraudulent
concealment, or possibly making the argument of why the statute of limitations cited by the

respondent does not apply, and why the arbitrator should apply some longer statute of
limitations.
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single arbitrator, or the chairman of the panel in conjunction with one other
panel member. 103 The resolution of these pre-hearing motions normally
involves consideration by a lawyer. To present the most effective arguments,
the claimant and his advocate should be prepared to submit a legal brief on
the issues raised in whatever challenge is made to the pleadings by the
respondents.
Even if the respondents do not challenge the claim itself, they may file
some collateral pleading, such as a third-party claim, cross-claim or a
counterclaim. 0 4 If that happens, the advocate and his customer should be
prepared to analyze the new pleadings and determine whether it is appropriate to move to strike them, move for a severance and separate hearing, or
pursue the arbitration.' 5 This analysis requires knowledge of the applicable rules and underlying legal principles.
In addition to possible disputes which may arise in connection with the
pleadings, the time period between filing of the claim and the commencement
of the hearings is likely to involve some discovery. The methods to obtain
discovery are slightly different under the AAA and securities industry
arbitration rules. In both forums, though, there is an opportunity for formal
fact investigation.0 6
Under the AAA rules, there is a preference for a preliminary hearing
during which the arbitrator and the parties will discuss an orderly process for
limited discovery, including the exchange of pertinent documents, identification of witnesses to be called, whatever depositions may be allowed, and
other matters. 0 7 As a part of that AAA process, arbitrators have authority
to issue interim orders to safeguard properties which are the subject matter
of the arbitration and other matters. 0 This process involves collateral
issues of spoilation of evidence which may give rise to different substantive
claims, contacts with witnesses, and gathering evidence by way of affidavit.109 There are rules which provide the format for affidavits and declarations which are obtained and used in court proceedings in California.""0
A declaration which fails to adhere to the appropriate format may not be
admissible in an arbitration proceeding-so it must be artfully drafted.

103. See, e.g., HOBLIN, supra note 79, at 7-2 et seq.
104. NASD CODE OF ARB. PRO., supra note 9, § 25.
105. HOBLIN, supra note 79, at 6-12.
106. See, e.g., NASD CODE OF ARB. PRO., supra note 9, § 32(a)-(b); AAA RULES, supra
note 9, Rule 11.
107. AAA RULES, supra note 9, Rule 10.
108. Id. Rule 35.
109. Under AAA Commercial Arbitration Rule 32, evidence by way of affidavit can be
submitted at the hearing without regard to evidentiary hearsay problems that would be
encountered in a trial in a conventional court setting. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule 32 (1993). See also Bell Aerospace Co. v. Local 516,
UAW, 500 F.2d 921, 923 (2d Cir. 1974).
110. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2009-2015.6 (1983); 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (1988).
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Under both AAA and SRO rules, parties are permitted to take depositions in very limited circumstances.' Typically, those are instances where
a potential witness with relevant testimony will be unable to attend the
hearing because of serious illness or difficulty in coming to the place of the
hearing. In those instances, someone representing the claimant should attend
the deposition either as the principal interrogator or as a secondary
interrogator to protect the interests of the claimant. If the deposition is to be
taken of an uncooperative or unwilling witness, a subpoena will be required.
Likewise, during the pre-hearing discovery period there could be useful
information available to a claimant in other related proceedings that could be
found through a review of court records or other sources. Legal knowledge
on the part of the claimant and his advocate will be required to determine
whether this material is relevant, whether it can be obtained, and whether it
might have some collateral estoppel benefit. All these considerations require
legal analysis.
During the pre-hearing discovery proceedings, it is very likely that some
of the discovery requested either by or from the claimant could be subject to
a privilege such as the attorney-client privilege,"' the marital privilege,"3 the physician-patient privilege," 4 or some other privilege. This
too requires legal analysis.
The claimant and his advocate need to be aware of the scope of the
various legal privileges in determining whether to provide information or to
pursue such information that has been requested but not produced by the
respondents. To the extent such information is not produced, it can have
adverse consequences at the hearing-such as a preclusion order." '5
Inadvertent disclosure of such information in the discovery phase of an
arbitration can also have far-reaching consequences for a party in later
proceedings." 6
In responding to the motion to compel, the claimant has to make a
number of important choices which necessarily require a knowledge of the
law. A threshold decision is to determine whether there is a privilege which
enables the claimant to withhold his tax returns from production to the
respondent. Under California law, tax returns are privileged from discovery
in most court proceedings." 7 Under federal law, however, the taxpayer's

111. HOBLIN, supra note 79, at 10-14; United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Corp., 597
P.2d 290 (N.M. 1979); Constantine Katsori, The Arbitrationof a Public Securities Dispute, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 287 n.52 (1984).
112. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1994); CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West
1994); FED. R. EVID. 501.
113. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 980-987 (West 1994).
114. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 990-999 (West 1994).
115. SICA ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 9, at 14-16.
116. E.g., Cheever v. Southern Clays, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 128 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
117. Say-On Drugs v. Superior Court, 538 P.2d 739, 742 (Cal. 1975).
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privilege is much weaker and is rarely available to a party." 8 Because the
sale of securities often involves interstate commerce, an argument could be
made that securities arbitration falls within the coverage of the Federal
Arbitration Act," 9 and accordingly federal law may apply;" 0 but to a
certain degree, state law also could apply if there is a state choice of law
clause in the parties' contract.' 2' It is a complicated choice of law issue as
to whether tax returns must be produced by a claimant in an arbitration
proceeding held in California arising out of the sale of securities. All of
these complicated legal issues normally require the skill of a lawyer for
effective resolution.
C. The Hearing
Most securities arbitrations held by either the AAA or the SROs include
a lawyer as the chairman of the panel, one of the panel members, or possibly
a staff attorney from the SRO or the AAA present or on call to resolve legal
issues that arise at the hearing." Notwithstanding the rules in both the
AAA and the SROs that the Rules of Evidence are not strictly followed,'23
the hearing is usually patterned after the basic structure of a trial, with
opening statements, closing arguments and examination of witnesses."
The method of examining witnesses is very similar to that used in a trial,
with direct examination, cross-examination, identification and offering of
documentary evidence. All of these procedures are familiar to lawyers who
have studied them in law school and in continuing education courses and
utilized them in court. 12
As a result of their training and experience, many lawyers develop
effective techniques for examining witnesses to elicit the most complete and
accurate testimony and at the same time avoid the introduction of facts
adverse to their case. Even in arbitrations, lawyers often utilize the Rules
118. Heathman v. District Court, 503 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Bader, 83
F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Weiner v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 76 F.R.D. 624 (S.D. Fla.
1977).
119. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208 (1988).
120. H. WARREN KNIGHT, ET AL., CAL. PRAc. GUIDE: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
4-46 to 4-54 (The Rutter Group, 1993).
121. Many agreements between investors and their stockbrokers contain a New York choice
of law provision. If the arbitration is initiated by a filing with the NASD in New York with a
request for a California situs, is the privilege applicable to the provision of claimant's tax returns
governed by New York law, by California laws or by federal law? The determination of this
issue involves a complex choice of law analysis that is usually the subject of a full semester
course in most law schools.
122. HOBLIN, supra note 79, at 12-5.
123. NASD CODE OF ARB. PRO., supra note 9, § 34; AAA RULES, supra note 9, Rule 32.
124. HOBLIN, supra note 79, at 10-7.

125. In Moore v. Conliffe, 871 P.2d 204 (Cal. 1994), the California Supreme Court
reasoned that a private contractual arbitration proceeding is a "judicial proceeding" for purposes
of making the testimony of witnesses in such proceedings privileged under California Civil Code
Section 47. Id. at 211.
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of Evidence to block the introduction of certain unfavorable material, such
as by the assertion of privileges and reference to the rules of relevance. 6
These techniques are well known to lawyers, and subtleties of the techniques
are often not appreciated by lay advocates. Likewise, in the opening
statement and closing arguments, lawyers are trained both in school and in
continuing education seminars on how best to present evidence in a way that
will be effectively understood by a trier of fact. To be sure, there are many
lawyers who are ineffective at using these skills; but, for the most part, even
an unskilled lawyer will have an advantage over a lay advocate because of
training and experience.
D. Post-HearingConsiderations
Normally in the AAA and sometimes in the SROs, the hearing is not
completed at the time the parties finish their closing arguments. The
arbitrators frequently ask for post-hearing briefs to resolve difficult issues of
law or fact which have arisen during the hearing. 27 The normal process
after the completion of final arguments is for the arbitrators to request
closing briefs and then take the matter under submission.'
The issues
covered in these briefs often involve legal matters and require skill at legal
research and legal writing. Most lawyers spend at least one semester and
oftentimes a full year in law school studying legal research and writing.
They normally put these skills to use in writing their post-hearing briefs by
pulling together the law and applicable facts to make the best possible
arguments for their client. Lay advocates may attempt to submit briefs based
solely on logic (or logic mixed with emotion) without any reference to the
law. When these matters are being resolved by a lawyer, chairperson or
panel members who are legally trained, it is probable that the brief submitted
by the lawyer will be the more persuasive.
Even after the arbitrators issue the award, there are still additional
procedures available to a party dissatisfied with the result. That party can
possibly seek confirmation, correction, modification or vacation of the award
1 law.
under both state 9 and federal 30
These procedures can only be
pursued in court by a licensed lawyer or by the claimant acting as his own
attorney.

126. Cf. Sunshine Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers, 823 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1987)
(arbitrators may rely on evidence that is not admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence)
and Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 654 F. Supp. 1487, 1511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (documents may
be excluded from evidence at arbitration under FED. R. EvID. 408 as settlement negotiations).
127. SICA ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 9, at 25-26.
128. Id.
129. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1285-1287.6 (West 1994).
130. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-13 (1988).
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IV. A COMPARISON OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF USING A LAWYER
VERSUS AN UNLICENSED ADVOCATE IN PURSUING A
SECURITIES CLAIM INAN ARBITRATION PROCEEDING
Wholly apart from the practical implications of hiring an unlicensed
advocate rather than a lawyer, there are legal implications that flow from the
claimant's choice of "counsel."
In California, a party has a statutory right to counsel in an arbitration."' There is no corresponding statutory right to a lay advocate." 2
Lawyers are subject to licensing'33 and oversight' by the California
Supreme Court (acting through the California State Bar). Normally, to be
admitted to the Bar, there is a prerequisite that the lawyers have a certain
amount of education from an accredited institution, pass a bar-administered
examination after the first year of law school, or complete an approved
course of study under the supervision of a licensed lawyer or judge. 5
There is no counterpart education or experience requirement for unlicensed
lay advocates. In addition, there are other requirements to be able to
practice law in California, such as being of good moral character.3 6 No
similar restrictions are imposed on lay advocates.
Once a client and a lawyer make contact, there are many restrictions on
lawyers imposed by law that are designed to ensure that the client is treated
fairly and honestly. After agreeing to represent a client, a lawyer is
specifically prohibited from taking on representation that may be adverse to
that client.Y 7 California lawyers are also required to take minimum
continuing legal education to heighten their awareness of potential con"'
flicts. 38
Often the identification of a conflict can be a complex matter for
131.

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §

1282.4 (West 1994).

132. The rules of all the SROs provide that parties have the right to "counsel." Cf. NASD
CODE OF ARB. PRO., supra note 9, § 27 with BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE ARBITRATION CODE
§ 15 (1991). These rules are identical, but interpreted differently. The NASD follows the SICA
Arbitrators Manual, allowing lay advocates to represent private customers in disputes between
private customers and its members. However, the NASD does not allow lay advocates to
represent its members or associated persons in its disciplinary proceedings which are similar to,
but more informal than, its arbitrations. In re First Choice Securities Corp., Release No.
31,089 [Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)) (review of disciplinary action taken by
NASD). The Boston Stock Exchange, on the other hand, takes the position that only licensed
attorneys are permitted to represent parties in its customer/member arbitrations. See Letter from
Max Mahoney, Staff Attorney, Boston Stock Exchange, to John H. L'Estrange, Jr. (Apr. 12,
1994) (on file with author).
133. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060 (West 1994).
134. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West 1994).
135. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060(e) (West 1994).
136. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060(b) (West 1994).
137. CAL. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT 3-300, 3-310 (1994).
138.
Each active member of the State Bar ... shall, within 36-month periods designated
by the State Bar, complete at least 36 hours of legal education approved by the State
Bar or offered by a State Bar-approved provider. Eight of these hours shall address
legal ethics or law practice management, four hours of which shall be legal ethics.
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which the lawyer has resources available at the State Bar to ensure that the
client receives full, honest and fair representation.,
No similar restrictions apply to lay advocates.
In California, lawyers are required to have written engagement
agreements with clients which must include certain elements.1,0
Although it is not required by law, California lawyers typically have
malpractice insurance which provides a financial resource if the lawyer is
negligent in the performance of his professional duties. In addition, each
attorney in California must make a disclosure in his mandatory written
engagement agreement if he neither has malpractice insurance coverage nor
"[Hias filed with the State Bar an executed copy of a written agreement
guaranteeing payment of all claims against the attorney by his or her clients
for errors or omissions arising out of the practice of law by the attorney" in
a specified amount.141
In those instances where a licensed lawyer requires the client to post
monies in advance to cover expenses, the client has some confidence that the
funds will not be lost or misused. This is so, in part, because under
4
California law, lawyers are required to maintain a client trust account 1
into which attorneys must deposit all funds received or
held for the benefit
143
of clients, including advances for costs and expenses.
Under California law, a lawyer is required to maintain in confidence all
confidential information received from his client.'44 The law also provides
that confidential communications between a lawyer and a client are protected
by a privilege from involuntary disclosure to third parties. 45 One of the
prerequisites of the attorney-client privilege is that there be an attorney-client
relationship. 46 In California, this same privilege does not apply to the
relationship between a client and a non-lawyer advocate. 47
From the time of the initial contact with the client until the issuance of
the final arbitration award, a lawyer is engaged in a number of activities such
as communicating with the client, drafting the statement of claim, legal research, communication with potential witnesses, and other fact- and lawgathering processes. All of this activity by the lawyer is protected by a

CAL. R. CT.

958(c).

139. The State Bar Ethics Hotline (800-238-4427) is available to members of the California
State Bar to provide information about ethics questions.
140. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6147, 6148 (West 1994).
141. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6147(a)(6), 6148(a)(4) (West 1994).
142. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6210 (West 1994).
143. CAL. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT § 4-100 (1994).
144. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1994).
145. FED. R. EVID. 501; CAL. EvID. CODE § 952 (West 1994); Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 449
U.S. 383, 391 (1981).
146. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950-952 (West 1994).
147. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6125-6133 (West 1994).
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qualified work-product privilege preventing involuntary disclosure of his
work and industry to third parties. '4
In connection with an arbitration hearing, a qualified lawyer has the
ability to handle all ancillary proceedings, such as discovery, in aid of
arbitration. 149 The lawyer also can pursue provisional remedies available
in ancillary court proceedings. 50 If appropriate, the lawyer can effectively
fend off attempts by the respondent to stay the arbitration by some collateral
court proceeding 5 ' or to seek a consolidation of his client's arbitration with
another related arbitration.'52 At the hearing, a trained lawyer is charged
by law with the responsibility to have sufficient knowledge to identify issues
and effectively conduct the trial-like proceedings.'
California law provides a number of other protections for a client. For
example, the lawyer is obligated to deliver to the client all papers belonging
to the client, with no expense to the client, at the conclusion of the
engagement.154 If there is any dispute over the amount of attorney's fees
or compensation owed to the attorney, the attorney is obligated by law to
submit that fee dispute to nonbinding arbitration at the election of the
client.' 55

Notwithstanding the extensive regulation of attorneys and statutory
protections afforded to attorneys' clients, unlicensed securities advocates have
urged a continuation of their own role in the securities arbitration system.'56 The principal argument advanced by lay advocates is that they
have much more extensive knowledge of the securities industry and practical
experience than most lawyers. This knowledge and experience is undoubtedly a benefit, but it affords the unlicensed advocates an advantage only with
small claims.
Unlicensed advocates with prior securities industry experience are often
able to evaluate small claims more quickly than a lawyer because they do not
148. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2018 (West 1994). See also FED. R. Civ. PROC. § 26(b)(3)
(federal work product doctrine).
149. Discovery is permitted, in a limited sense, in arbitration proceedings. 9 U.S.C. § 7
(1989); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1983.1 (West 1994); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic
Co., 597 P.2d 290. 302 (N.M. 1979); McRae v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 346, 350 (Ct.
App. 1963); Constantine N. Kastoris, Arbitrationof a Public SecuritiesDispute, 53 FORDHAM
L. REV. 279, 287 n.52 (1984); Constantine N. Kastoris, Annotation, Discovery in Aid of
Arbitration, 98 A.L.R.2d 1247 (1964).
150. 9 U.S.C. § 6 (1988); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.8 (West 1994).
151. W.J. Dunn, Annotation, Disqualificationof Arbitratorby Court or Stay of Arbitration

Proceedings Prior to Award on Ground of Interest, Bias, Prejudice, Collusion, or Fraud of

Arbitrators, 65 A.L.R.2d 755 (1959).
152. SICA ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 9, at 6-7.
153. A lawyer is charged with having the same degree of expertise possessed by others in
the community exercising similar skills. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961).
154. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(n) (West 1990); CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROF.
CONDUCT § 3-700(D) (1994).
155. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6200-6206 (West 1994).
156. See, e.g., Paul N. Young, SEC. ARI. COMMENTATOR, Feb. 1994, at 16 (letter to the
editor by Paul N. Young, CEO of the Securities Arbitration Group, Inc.).
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require the assistance of experts to evaluate the raw data. They are also
often able to handle small claims more economically because they do not
need to engage an expert to assist them in the formulation and presentation
of the claim. However, these efficiencies are limited to unlicensed advocates
with extensive prior industry experience. Persons with little or no prior
industry experience who purport to represent investors in securities
arbitrations against their brokers have no inherent advantage over lawyers.
The advantage of unlicensed advocates is directly related to the amount
at stake. Whether the arbitration is being financed directly by the customer
or with funds advanced by the advocate, the more that is at stake, the more
likely it will be that the customer or advocate will be willing to spend the
amount required to hire experts and consultants to evaluate and prepare the
claim. There are many experts and consultants with industry experience who
regularly offer their services in securities arbitrations. These circumstances
suggest that the benefit of unlicensed advocates with demonstrable expertise
can be best utilized in small cases.
V. PROPOSAL

Because of the dearth of appellate opinions in California on the issue, it
remains unclear whether unlicensed advocates will continue to be challenged
in California when they represent claimants securities arbitrations. The
United States Congress could help resolve this problem by either amending
the Federal Arbitration Act or adopting a statute explicitly addressing the
issue. Though this article takes no, stance on whether unlicensed advocates
should be completely prohibited, some restrictions on the activities of
unlicensed advocates could help protect the consumer from abuse by such
advocates.
If unlicensed advocates are allowed, each advocate should disclose in
writing to consumers (i.e., the prospective claimants or plaintiffs) that the
advocate is not an attorney. This would, in principle at least, notify the
consumer that the advocate's advice is not from one who has undergone the
rigors of a legal education and passed the California bar examination and
moral fitness requirements. It would also notify the consumer that communications with the advocate are not cloaked with the protection of the attorneyclient privilege. Hopefully, the consumer would be better able to evaluate
the advocate's advice and avoid the misconception that an advocate's
assistance is the only option available.
Advocates should be required to have written engagement agreements
with the "clients," and those agreements should have the same essential
elements listed in California Business and Professions Code sections 6147
and 6148. As with lawyers, the absence of such an agreement should leave
the advocate with a quantum meruit remedy to collect his fee for services
rendered.
Advocates should also be required to obtain liability insurance and
bonding in an amount reasonably adequate to provide for any negligence or
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malfeasance by the advocate. This requirement not only helps protect the
consumer from careless or unscrupulous advocates, but insofar as insurance
helps spread the costs of misconduct to all advocates, it also serves as an
incentive for advocates to offer only the highest quality of service, thereby
improving their own effectiveness and reputation within the community.
Though attorneys are not required to carry such insurance, 5 7 attorneys
have other incentives sufficient to motivate a large majority of attorneys to
carry malpractice insurance. Advocates have no similar incentives, and thus
a requirement that they carry such insurance will likely be necessary to
effectively help protect the consumer.
The advocates should be required to maintain fiduciary-type trust
accounts which enable them to segregate client funds. It is not necessary that
the advocates adhere to the same requirements imposed on lawyer trust
accounts. It would be sufficient if they disclose the existence of the trust
account in their engagement agreement, and attest to the existence of the
separate trust account in their registration with the SRO.
Like attorneys who must undergo detailed scrutiny before being admitted
to a state bar, advocates should be required to satisfy a minimum level of
professional competence and integrity standards. One selling point advocates
promote is their securities industry experience, which ostensibly makes them
more effective at evaluating and representing clients in securities disputes.
Since it is experience, and not formal education, that at least arguably makes
advocates more effective than attorneys, advocates should be required to
obtain minimum experience within the industry.
In addition, advocates should be required to meet certain minimum moral
fitness standards. Specifically, persons who (a) have had either a securities
license or a license to practice law revoked, (b) have voluntarily surrendered
a securities license or a license to practice law with disciplinary charges
pending, or (c) have been the subject of a consent decree or permanent
injunction issued by a securities regulatory agency or court should not be
permitted to become advocates. These measures would help eliminate known
miscreants, thereby protecting the consumer and improving both the
effectiveness and reputation of the industry.
In addition to minimum professional standards, advocates should also be
required to register their practice with the arbitration departments of the
individual SROs. Advocates should be required to show that they meet the
above professional standards, that they are familiar with the securities laws
of the United States and of the states in which they represent consumers, and
that they are familiar with the arbitration procedures of each forum in which
they will represent consumers. The SEC, with this new oversight responsibility, should establish provisions for criminal and civil liability for
unlicensed advocates who violate any requirements. This would give the

157. See supra part IV.
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SEC the ability to oversee and monitor registered advocates, as well as
enforce the professional standards imposed.
Though this article does not propose a ban on the practices of unlicensed
advocates, the establishment of limits on the value of controversies in which
advocates can participate would seem appropriate. As explained above, the
major purported benefit of unlicensed advocates is their ability to resolve
smaller claims more efficiently than some attorneys. Advocates, with some
prior experience, may be more efficient at evaluating small claims because
lawyers relatively unfamiliar with the securities industry must rely on experts
to evaluate data. As a practical matter, this makes many attorneys less
effective when the overall recovery is small. However, where large amounts
are at stake, an attorney can offer a more effective representation, since the
relative expense of an expert is less and the need for a broad range of legal
skills is great. Thus, advocates should be permitted to represent consumers
in relatively small claims, perhaps those with damage claims of less than
$50,000, but should not be permitted to represent alone a consumer in
disputes claiming more than that amount (Certain exceptions to this general
rule may be appropriate, such as where the advocate is a relative or personal
friend of the client.). This proposal would effectively allow advocates to
practice where they are effective, but would protect the consumer where the
advocate's narrow experience is not as large a factor in the overall balance
of effective representation.
If advocates are permitted to practice in the United States, it should only
be in conjunction with regulation, oversight, and professional standards.
Such measures would not only protect the consumer from those few
unscrupulous or reckless advocates, but would also serve to improve and
legitimize a vocation that may provide significant benefits to the consumer.
CONCLUSION

The emergence of non-lawyer advocates demonstrates a need that the
legal market has not effectively met. Most consumers have limited resources
with which to pursue their relatively uncomplicated claims. Advocates may
provide a means for fast and efficient resolution of these types of claims.
However, as this article details, advocates typically cannot provide the level
of representation that attorneys can, which may be needed in larger claims.
In addition, consumers are vulnerable to negligent or reckless activities of
advocates who generally are neither insured nor bonded. Moreover,
consumers may be mistaken about the relative abilities of lawyers and
unlicensed advocates, which may lead them to mistake less expensive
representation for a bargain, when they may need much more expertise than
an unlicensed advocate can provide. The proposals laid out herein would
give the consumer the benefit of inexpensive resolution of uncomplicated
disputes by an industry of experienced, regulated arbitration advocates. Yet,
since not every potential arbitration is one appropriate for unlicensed
advocates, at least some limitations should exist on their ability to represent
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clients in arbitration. These innovations would ultimately serve both the
consumer as well as the advocate industry by raising the level of service as
well as the prestige of unlicensed arbitration advocates.
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